Club Objectives and Ticket Pricing in Professional Team Sports

In this paper we analyze and compare the behavior of sports clubs in a profit and a win maximization league if the decisions on the optimal ticket price and the talent demand have to be made simultaneously. From this 2-decision-variable model, a few interesting conclusions, regarding the impact of the player salary level or a stadium capacity constraint on the ticket price, can be drawn. Also, some important policy implications are considered such as imposing maximum ticket prices, imposing salary caps and granting a government subsidy.

Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we discuss possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed.Social pacts; axiomatic bargaining; unions; issue linkage

The legal incidence of ad valorem taxes matters

It is well known that, for a specific tax, its economic incidence does not depend on which side of the market has the legal obligation to pay the tax. In this paper, we show that, for an ad valorem tax, this legal incidence does matter for the economic incidence. In particular, when a government imposes an ad valorem tax rate on the sale of a commodity, the resulting reduction in the market equilibrium level of sales will be larger when sellers are obliged to pay the tax than when buyers are obliged to pay the tax

A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls and investment in serial transport corridors

The purpose of this paper is to study toll and investment competition along a serial transport corridor competition allowing for partial cooperation between regional governments. Partial cooperation is modeled as a Nash bargaining problem with endogenous disagreement points. We show that the bargaining approach to partial cooperation implies lower tolls and higher quality and capacity investment than fully noncooperative behavior. Moreover, under bargaining, strategic behavior at the investment stage induces regions to offer lower quality and invest less in capacity as compared to full cooperation. Finally, Nash bargaining partially resolves the problem of welfare losses due to toll and capacity competition pointed out in the recent literature

Is there any scope for corporatism in stabilization policies?

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are nevertheless commonly observed in this context, we discuss possible explanations that reconcile the theory with actual observations. The policy implications of these explanations are also discussed

Edmond Hanssens, 'onze ontdekker van den Congo'

Hanssens, an compagnion to Stanley, died Congo 1884; he as honoured by his natal town Furnes (Flanders) with a statue by Jules Lagae and got a street named after hi